Pueblo—A Retrospective by Mobley, Richard
Naval War College Review
Volume 54





Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation




Commander Richard Mobley, U.S. Navy
North Korea’s seizure of the U.S. Navy intelligence-collection—officially,“environmental research”—ship USS Pueblo (AGER 2) on 23 January
1968 set the stage for a painful year of negotiations. Diplomacy ultimately freed
the crew; Pyongyang finally released the men in December 1968. However, in the
first days of the crisis—the focus of this article—it was the military that was
called upon to respond. Naval power would have played an important role in any
immediate attempts to force the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea to re-
lease the crew and ship. Failing that, the Seventh Fleet would have been on the
forefront of any retaliation.
Many works published over the last thirty-three years support this view.1
However, hundreds of formerly classified documents released to the public in
the late 1990s offer new insight into many aspects of the crisis. They provide an
unprecedentedly comprehensive documentary record of intelligence, planning,
and operational issues dominating the first two weeks of the crisis, after which
the Seventh Fleet began to withdraw from the Sea of Japan and the diplomatic
track assumed preeminence.
The release of these archival sources makes it
worthwhile to revisit a very useful case study in crisis
decision making involving naval forces. The newly
available documents make plain the imperfection of
the intelligence available to the operational com-
manders involved; caught by surprise, they had to
plan and move forces quickly to respond to a wide
range of contingencies. Also, the record exhibits the
dynamics in Washington and establishes what
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options the decision makers there thought were available to them. Finally, it
shows how military forces were in fact employed once the national strategy for
the crisis was settled upon.
The newly accessible material documents four main points about the early
part of the crisis. First, the U.S. intelligence community provided uneven
support. Analysts supplied detailed infor-
mation about Pueblo’s location and on the
capabilities and dispositions of the (North)
Korean People’s Army. They also assessed
how the potential allies of the North Korean
regime would react to the crisis, particularly
if the United States resorted to force. How-
ever, the intelligence community found the
North Korean motivations and intentions—
which were, of course, central to the crisis—
far more difficult to discern, as a result of its superficial understanding of
Pyongyang’s decision-making process.
Second, it is clear that within hours of the seizure, military staffs down to
fleet level, whose forces had been unsuitably deployed and otherwise unpre-
pared to protect Pueblo, devised and prepared to execute several options: to re-
take the ship, to prevent North Korea from salvaging it, to make a show of force
off Wonsan, and to seize a North Korean merchant vessel. Superiors in the chain
of command tempered these proposals but by no means discarded them.
Third, the released archives show that by 29 January the national command
authority—the president and secretary of defense, advised and supported by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff—had explored even more extensive military courses of ac-
tion. The importance of the roles naval forces would have played in a number of
them is striking. Although the national leadership shelved most of these propos-
als, some remained under consideration well into the crisis. Additionally, the
staffs of the Joint Chiefs and of the commander in chief of U.S. forces in the
Pacific reviewed conventional and nuclear contingency plans for Korea in case
retaliation supplanted deterrence as the preeminent objective.
Fourth, the newly accessible documents trace how national strategy and
theater posture effectively merged on 25 January with the implementation of
Seventh Fleet’s Operation FORMATION STAR. Over the next ten days, the U.S.
Navy and U.S. Air Force “surged” more than three hundred aircraft into the
theater to offset the unfavorable balance of air power between the two Koreas.
U.S. forces in Korea itself substantially upgraded their readiness, although they
did not raise their defense readiness condition. Forces of the Republic of Korea
(ROK), already on heightened alert following a North Korean attempt to
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assassinate President Park Chung Hee on 21 January, redeployed to contain any
further North Korean provocations along the demilitarized zone.
THE INTELLIGENCE EQUATION
During the first days of the crisis, intelligence analysts supporting tactical and
strategic commanders tried to answer a number of wide-ranging and funda-
mental questions. Their answers significantly influenced decision makers at all
levels of the U.S. command structure.
What were the North’s capabilities against the South? The Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, concluded that North Korea could launch a sur-
prise attack across the demilitarized zone with the twelve divisions and one bri-
gade then deployed near the zone. A larger attack, employing between twenty
and twenty-two of the total twenty-five North Korean divisions (or equivalents)
supported by about five hundred combat jet aircraft, could be delivered with
little warning. The North Korean air force enjoyed substantial superiority over
its Republic of Korea counterpart. All of its fighters (MiG-21s, MiG-19s, and
MiG-17s) and some of its Il-28 bombers were dispersed in caves and revetments;
its fuel storage facilities were dispersed and “hardened” (strengthened to resist
damage, as by concrete bunkers). In contrast, the air forces in the South com-
prised 203 Korean fighters and 151 American fighters, at unhardened bases.
Aircraft, fuel stocks and terminals, radar sites, communications centers, and
surface-to-air missile sites were all vulnerable to low-altitude surprise attack.
This airpower imbalance and the exposed nature of the airfields in South Korea
became a major concern to U.S. decision makers.2 The commander in chief of
Pacific Command subsequently concluded that seventy aircraft would be lost to the
first wave of a North Korean air campaign against aircraft on the ground, and 110
to the second wave.3 As for the North Korean navy, however, the Central Intelligence
Agency characterized it as a small defensive force, limited to coastal operations.4
What was the North Korean army’s posture? Following the seizure of Pueblo,
North Korean military units assumed a heightened state of alert and maintained
it throughout the early days of the crisis. Analysts believed that the alert was
defensive; there were “no signs of significant preparations for offensive action.”5
For example, the CIA reported that as of 28 January, North Korean naval patrol
activity remained heavy, particularly off Wonsan on the east coast, where it
extended thirty miles into the Sea of Japan.6
What had been Pyongyang’s objective? The CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the State Department rapidly concluded that North Korea had
acted independently.7 Pueblo’s seizure had grown out of the regime’s desire for
unification; Pyongyang’s public statements had become more militant since Oc-
tober 1966. On top of this, the CIA noted, North Korea had been “uniformly
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hostile” toward all vessels in nearby waters since the Korean War. In fact, few South
Korean or U.S. ships ever approached North Korea’s coast; the exceptions were
ROK Navy patrol boats escorting fishing vessels. The North had sunk one of
these patrol boats in 1967 and in November 1967 had resumed accusations
about “spy boats” (which had begun around 1964).8 Detecting Pueblo off its
coast at least by 22 January, the North would have been sorely tempted to harass
it, at least; two North Korean fishing trawlers had circled and approached to
within thirty yards of Pueblo on that day.9 The CIA assessed that the “report
which the trawlers probably made would have been enough to justify making
plans to deal with the Pueblo and sending a naval vessel out on patrol.”10 The CIA
concluded that the ship
was almost certainly taken as a result of a decision at the highest levels of the North
Korean government. . . . It seems likely . . . that the North Koreans had identified the
ship and her mission at least a day in advance. It is possible that the original intent
was only to harass and drive off the Pueblo; the final decision to take the ship into
Wonsan may have only been taken when it eventually appeared that U.S. forces were
not coming to assist the Pueblo.11
In any event, the CIA quickly warned senior U.S. officials that the North
Korean regime was prepared for a “period of sharply heightened tensions.”
It assessed that Pyongyang would seek
to extract propaganda value from the
crisis “for some days at least.” Interest-
ingly, the initial CIA assessment implied
a role for U.S. military pressure, arguing
that the North Koreans would release
neither ship nor crew “unless they judge
the U.S. will resort to retaliatory action,
such as an air attack against the patrol
craft that seized the Pueblo.”12
Where was Pueblo? The United States
had tracked the newly captured ship
into Wonsan. A photo-reconnaissance
mission flown on 25 January confirmed
it was still there, along with seven Komar
missile patrol boats and several patrol
craft.13 The imagery revealed no damage
to the ship.14 On 12 February, human
intelligence reporting indicated that the
North Koreans had moved Pueblo from
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Changjahwan-man (Chojikan) to Munp’yong-ni (Wonsan), a naval facility
nearby.15 On 29 April, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Pueblo had
moved from Munp’yong-ni to Najin, a port near the Soviet border.16
What were North Korea’s economic and political vulnerabilities? North Korea’s
predominantly overland trade patterns and communist trading partners were
not susceptible to naval action or diplomacy. The CIA quickly reported that ap-
proximately 87 percent of North Korea’s trade in 1966 was with the communist
world, 75 percent with the Soviet Union and China. With the exception of bulk
commodities, almost all of this trade with its two bordering neighbors was
overland. Japan accounted for nearly half of Pyongyang’s noncommunist trade.
Therefore, a maritime blockade could reduce North Korea’s trade by no more
than 25 percent, representing that with the noncommunist world and with
communist countries other than China and the Soviet Union. Japanese and
Soviet-flag ships would be primarily affected; they represented roughly two-thirds
of all merchant ships entering North Korean ports. The remainder were Polish
and British (8 percent each), Greek (5 percent), and an assortment of other ships
flying free world and communist flags.17
North Korea had only five merchant ships of its own (a sixth was being fitted
out in Nampo) that could be seized in retaliation; the locations of those not
believed to be in port were unknown. Four were attached to the fishing fleet.
All were under two thousand gross registered tons, except Paektu-San (7,218
tons). The status of three Polish-flag dry-cargo ships operated by the Joint
Korean-Polish Ship Broker’s Company was continually monitored.18
The Central Intelligence Agency painted a picture of a North Korea with sim-
ilarly few political vulnerabilities. All communist states would wish the affair to
“inflict the maximum feasible damage on the U.S. position, particularly with
reference to Vietnam.” Still, while these allies would want to hinder U.S. efforts
in Vietnam, the CIA believed, none sought hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
Moscow, accordingly, would seek propaganda points but would counsel Pyong-
yang to avoid further provocations that might trigger U.S. retaliation. Nonethe-
less, the agency warned, Moscow might not be able to restrain Pyongyang
should the latter pursue a more belligerent course. China would probably offer
ambiguous advice but counsel against “any course of undue risk.” Both states
were aware that South Korea could also take actions, with or without U.S. con-
currence, that could “balloon the crisis out of control.” This factor, the CIA be-
lieved, gave Moscow and Beijing an additional incentive to moderate their
advice to Pyongyang.19
What if the United States attacked? By 26 January, the intelligence community
had begun to assess likely North Korean responses to several possible U.S.
actions. The State Department judged that there was “a fair chance” that the
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communist regime would release at least part of the crew in response to a combi-
nation of warnings, visible military preparations, and a U.S. show of force.
Pyongyang would probably see little to be gained from holding the entire crew
after exploiting the incident for propaganda value. This outcome could not be
guaranteed. Moreover, the assessment observed, shows of force and the like
could be “damaging” to South Korea. Further, the communists might regard
some low-level military action (such as a blockade, attacks against a limited set
of North Korean targets, etc.) as meant only to assuage American public opin-
ion; they might doubt U.S. determination to go farther. In such a case, the North
Koreans would probably “punish” the crew immediately. They might retaliate by
launching air strikes against South Korean airfields or even U.S. aircraft carriers,
though such acts seemed unlikely,
because of the high risk of escala-
tion and ground war. In fact, a
State Department memorandum
suggested, were the United States
to strike North Korea, the Soviets would probably go “quite far in private pres-
sures” on Pyongyang to end the crisis—regardless of their public stance. Still, no
foreseeable scenario guaranteed the crew’s release, let alone that of the ship.20
What were the Soviets doing? The Soviet Union apparently acted quickly to
harvest the intelligence windfall that had been brought into Wonsan Harbor. On
28 January, the CIA reported that a Soviet Pacific Fleet aircraft had made a highly
unusual flight into North Korea. The agency believed that the aircraft might
have carried Soviet personnel to examine Pueblo and its surviving equipment.21
The Soviet Pacific Fleet also deployed several units to monitor the growing
U.S. task force. By 1 February, U.S. naval intelligence was tracking a Kildin
guided-missile destroyer, a Kotlin destroyer, a Riga destroyer escort, and four
auxiliaries in the Sea of Japan. On 5 February (after some of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet ships had departed), six Soviet destroyers steamed into the Sea of Japan.
By then, thirteen Soviet vessels—including two missile cruisers, three missile
destroyers, two tankers, and two intelligence collectors—were in those waters.
However, some of these were probably reliefs for ships that had arrived previously.22
What more could be determined? Surprised by the ship’s seizure, national
decision makers were starved for information. On 24 January the senior Pueblo
crisis group met for the first time; its members included Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and certain of his principal
assistants; Walt Rostow, the national security advisor; Richard Helms, the direc-
tor of central intelligence; and General Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The president was to attend several of its meetings but was
not present for the first.) General Wheeler felt that the first thing to do, before
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any of the military actions under discussion could be implemented, was to col-
lect more photo intelligence.23 McNamara agreed that the intelligence gaps had
to be filled; he hoped to have a reconnaissance plan from Helms by day’s end.
Planners considered both drones and BLACK SHIELD (probably involving the
SR-71 Blackbird, the only aircraft capable of safely flying a reconnaissance
mission against Wonsan). At a cabinet-level meeting on the evening of 24 Janu-
ary, Helms pushed for three reconnaissance passes (presumably by BLACK SHIELD)
in one day over Wonsan. McNamara endorsed a three-pass mission, arguing that
the loss rate would be low. The first useful imagery was obtained the next day; af-
ter preliminary interpretation, it was to be shipped to Washington by Sunday, 28
January. The United States also continued to fly BUMBLE BUG drone reconnais-
sance missions. The drone, which was launched from a C-130 aircraft, was
scheduled to fly on 29 January. On the 29th, however, the advisory group agreed
to suspend reconnaissance against North Korea for several days.24
THE INITIAL RESPONSE IN THE THEATER
The documentary record shows that as the national command authorities began
in the first twenty-four hours to formulate a strategy for dealing with the sei-
zure of Pueblo, forces in the theater were already preparing to carry out any of
several retaliatory contingencies. The commander of U.S. naval forces in Japan
notified the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (a component of the
Pacific Command) of the seizure at 1420 (2:20 P.M.) Korean time, within an
hour of the event.* For the commanders and staffs of the Pacific Fleet and its
subordinate Seventh Fleet, preparations entailed rapid planning and redeploy-
ing of units. The Air Force also began moving the first of several hundred air-
craft toward or into the Republic of Korea. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea,
with headquarters in Seoul, heightened his forces’ alert and surveillance status
and considered increasing readiness from the normal Defense Condition Four
to DEFCON Three.
The Pacific Fleet staff considered many options, some of which anticipated
the more deliberate assessment process that would occur in Washington over
the next six days. These options included requesting permission to conduct
land-based or naval air strikes against “a suitable target”; steaming a carrier task
group into the Sea of Japan and conducting photo reconnaissance; seizing a
North Korean ship on the high seas; positioning Pueblo’s sister ship, USS Banner
(AGER 1), off Wonsan; disposing naval forces in such a way that the U.S. govern-
ment could credibly demand compensation, apologies, and guarantees from
North Korea; and blockading Wonsan.25
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Many naval messages, several of them later revised, resulted from the plan-
ning in the theater. At 1506 on the afternoon of the seizure, the commander of
the Seventh Fleet directed the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise
(CVN 65), the nuclear-powered
guided missile cruiser Truxtun
(CGN 35), and three destroyers
to proceed “at best speed” to the
southern end of the Tsushima
Strait.26 Between six and seven
that evening, Pacific Command ordered its forces to prepare for photo recon-
naissance of Wonsan to determine Pueblo’s position; at about the same time, the
commander in chief of the Pacific Command requested the Joint Chiefs to au-
thorize this reconnaissance if North Korea remained silent as to the ship’s loca-
tion.27 As a precaution, USS Banner was ordered to discontinue surveillance
operations off the east coast of Honshu and return to Yokosuka.28
At 1921 (7:21 P.M.), the commander of the Pacific Fleet directed the com-
mander of the Seventh Fleet to “take steps to place and support [a] destroyer
ASAP [as soon as possible] off Wonsan immediately outside 12-mile limit. Be
prepared to engage in operations that may include towing Pueblo and or re-
trieval of Pueblo crew/provide air cover as appropriate. Make sitreps [situation
reports] as appropriate and at least hourly.”29 The Seventh Fleet staff amplified
this order seventy-five minutes later, directing Enterprise into the Sea of Japan
and sending the destroyer USS Higbee (DD 806) toward Wonsan; a second de-
stroyer would follow.30 At about the same time the Pacific Fleet commander also
directed the Seventh Fleet commander to conduct photo reconnaissance missions
over Wonsan.31 The commander of the Seventh Fleet relayed this order at 2334
but advised his subordinates that since Pueblo was believed to be inside North
Korean territorial waters, no offensive military action was authorized unless di-
rected by higher authority.32 Shortly after midnight, the task group commander
onboard Enterprise responded that he planned flight operations during daylight
from a position east of Pusan to rearrange the air wing for future operations.33
Evidently, the national command authorities suddenly put the brakes on this
planning, preparation, and northward surging of naval forces. At 0138 in the
morning of the 24th, the Pacific Fleet commander directed all U.S. naval forces
to remain south of thirty-six degrees north latitude and to make no show of
force in the area of the incident; no destroyer would be positioned off Wonsan.34
Furthermore, by seven o’clock the Pacific Fleet commander had also directed the
cessation of signals-intelligence flights over the Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea.
Further, no antisubmarine warfare flights were allowed near the incident site,
with the exception of a two-plane barrier near the battle group.35
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Half an hour later, the commander in chief of Pacific Command confirmed
that the Joint Staff had prohibited shows of force. He explicitly directed the com-
mander of the Pacific Fleet not to position Higbee off Wonsan; other fleet units
repositioned as a result of the incident were to steam no farther north than their
present locations.36 Enterprise had advanced as far as the northeast end of the
Korea Strait, south of Pusan; by noon, to gain sea room, the carrier had with-
drawn southwesterly into the East China Sea. Higbee and three other destroyers,
Osbourn (DD 846), Collett (DD 730), and O’Bannon (DD 450), were to rendez-
vous with Enterprise there between the 24th and 26th of January.37
By midday on 24 January, the commander in chief, Pacific Command, took
further steps to reduce the risk of war, ordering his subordinate commanders to
“initiate no show of force along the Korean demilitarized zone or elsewhere ad-
jacent to North Korea. . . . U.S. naval and air forces will remain outside repeat
outside of the area within 80 NM [nautical miles] of the coast of North Korea
north of a line extending east from the DMZ [demilitarized zone]. This instruc-
tion does not alter your existing authorities and responsibilities for the security
of your forces.”38
Meanwhile, the U.S. Fifth Air Force had ordered all available F-105 fighter
bombers from Okinawa to Kunsan and Osan in Korea. Twelve F-105s deployed to
Osan by the 24th, and the Air Force began planning for a massive augmentation.39
The commanding general of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea notified his
forces of the Pueblo seizure and directed I Corps to bring its command posts to
operating strength. He instructed subordinate commands to heighten their alert
states and to review Defense Condition Three procedures. (In the event, the de-
fense condition was not raised from four to three for U.S. forces.) Meanwhile,
major elements of American and South Korean forces remained engaged in
counterinfiltration operations, which had accelerated after the North Korean at-
tempt to assassinate President Park on the 21st.40
General Charles H. Bonesteel III, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, was
particularly concerned about the active infiltration threat to the security of sur-
face-to-air missile and nuclear weapons sites. On the 24th he reported that he
was considering deploying another battalion from the U.S. 7th Division to rein-
force local defenses of these sites. Bonesteel also recommended an “expeditious
decision” to augment the Eighth Army, particularly for local security. Con-
cerned with the maritime borders, he indicated that he might soon recommend
that two U.S. destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft reinforce the South Korean
naval and air force units then conducting maritime patrol and interdiction.41
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REVIEWING THE MILITARY OPTIONS
Although diplomacy was quickly to become paramount, during the early phase
of the crisis the national command authorities devoted much time to military
options. Between 24 and 27 January, a series of meetings of the Pueblo crisis
group, the National Security Council, and the cabinet occurred. The early meet-
ings were wide-ranging brainstorming sessions in which the participants strove
to understand the facts of the case, ascertain North Korean motives, and then
identify and evaluate military and diplomatic options. The policy makers were
conservative; they sought to bound the crisis, and their paramount goal became
the crew’s return. But they also wanted to consider ways to pressure Pyongyang.
On Friday, 26 January, the State Department established an interagency Korea
Working Group, comprising representatives from the State and Defense Depart-
ments, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, the White House, and the U.S. Information Agency. The group was to
flesh out ten options in “think papers” addressing purpose, feasibility, risk, and
North Korean response. A high-level advisory group met on Monday, 29 Janu-
ary, to weigh these ten possible courses of action and the working group’s evalu-
ations of them.42
Selected air strikes on North Korea: As a retaliation for Pueblo’s seizure,
ninety-two Navy, U.S. Air Force, and South Korean air force aircraft could strike
the Wonsan air base and the naval base at Munp’yong-ni.43 The Korea Working
Group cautioned that the strikes would not free the crew or substantially reduce,
let alone disrupt, North Korean military capabilities. Attacks would be difficult
to defend legally; they would put the United States on the diplomatic defensive;
and they would risk escalation. In its report, the working group noted that the
Joint Chiefs preferred to attack all North Korean military airfields and neutral-
ize the entire North Korean air force in this course of action. Otherwise, losses of
strike aircraft would be high, since the North Korean air defense system could
concentrate on defending one or two targets.
Naval blockade of Wonsan: Given air cover, U.S. and possibly South Korean
naval units could impose a blockade within Wonsan’s twelve-mile limit. To
achieve air superiority, strikes against North Korean air force fields would “quite
possibly” be required. However, the Korea Working Group assessed that a block-
ade would pose only a minor inconvenience to the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic. Moreover, if the North Korean regime did not respond in the desired way, the
United States might be committed to an “indefinite, inconclusive, and politically
awkward” military option. World reaction would be adverse. Nevertheless, the
working group concluded that a blockade might eventually be useful.
Mine Wonsan Harbor: Enterprise-based A-6 attack aircraft could, by flying
seventeen sorties, drop eighty-three mines in one night; thereafter they could
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“reseed” the minefield as necessary. The working group projected the aircraft
loss rate at less than 2 percent. On the other hand, it argued, mining would pose
only a “minor inconvenience,” given the availability of other North Korean ports
and the possibility of Soviet mine countermeasures assistance.
Seize North Korean vessels: The purpose would be to retaliate in kind and then
trade the seized craft, either a merchant vessel or a warship, for Pueblo and its
crew. This option, the Korea Working Group believed, would be difficult to im-
plement because the North’s five
primary merchant ships and most
of its naval units were unlikely to
be under way. While not deemed
risky, this option seemed to have
little chance of securing release of
the Pueblo and, more importantly, the crew; it might, though, be “advantageous”
as a step in a “sequence of events.”
Sail USS Banner into the area where Pueblo had been seized: This complex op-
eration would demonstrate U.S. determination to exercise freedom of the seas.
The idea was to position Banner a minimum of thirteen miles from the North
Korean coast for eight days. Two destroyers, a cruiser, and possibly a South Ko-
rean unit would escort the AGER, and carrier aircraft would fly cover overhead.
U.S. Air Force aircraft in South Korea would assume “strip alert” (immediate
readiness to take off). The working group felt that the action would involve low
risk but would reduce the likelihood of the release of Pueblo and its crew. None-
theless, the group recommended that a plan be prepared for this option, in case
Washington decided to carry out a “relatively unprovocative” operation.
Recover cryptographic material jettisoned by Pueblo: An attempt would be
made to recover highly sensitive gear while exercising freedom of the seas. The
recovery would require a tug and mine warfare vessels from Sasebo, Japan, along
with special detection gear from the United States, and probably a midget
submarine (to be flown from Nassau). Enterprise and U.S. Air Force aircraft
would provide air cover. The salvage unit would operate during daylight only
and terminate the attempt after ten days. The working group stated no opinion
on the prospects of recovery but in general concluded that a recovery effort
would constitute “a legitimate display of U.S. activity and concern for U.S. rights
with little risk of provocation.” Supporting the course of action was a draft oper-
ation order. However, the letter from Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chief of Na-
val Operations, forwarding the draft plan commented that its “disadvantages far
outweigh its advantages” and recommended against it unless the recovery units
were assured of adequate air cover.44
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Conduct airborne reconnaissance: This proposal entailed flying reconnais-
sance missions in an attempt to convince Pyongyang that the United States was
preparing for military operations. High-performance tactical aircraft or drones
would cross the demilitarized
zone and North Korean coasts
and penetrate up to fifty miles
inland. Electronic warfare air-
craft would jam air defense and
surveillance radars. North Korea would likely down several drones, but the risk
to BLACK SHIELD missions was calculated at less than 1 percent, even against ex-
perienced surface-to-air missile crews. The working group concluded that re-
connaissance had some value as a pressure tactic.
Inform the Soviets of actual or possible military moves: Officially, the Soviets
would be advised that ongoing military movements were meant to deter further
North Korean provocations; in addition, however, “we might pointedly warn the
Soviets of actions we may be compelled to take.” In this scenario, Washington
would use an unofficial channel to warn Moscow of the “gravity of the situation”
and the need for “some action by the North Koreans to avoid further deteriora-
tion.”45 The State Department was to develop this option in greater detail as the
crisis progressed.
Raid across the Demilitarized Zone: A punitive raid across the demilitarized
zone could be staged against a significant installation, such as the North Korean
6th Division command post. Relying on surprise, an armor-heavy combined
U.S.–South Korean force would seize and destroy the facility. The working
group, however, warned that the raiders would sustain high casualties and that
the North Korean military should be expected to mount rapid “counter activi-
ties.” Moreover, if the operation went poorly, it could result in escalation to ma-
jor ground action; even if successful, it would be merely punitive.
Economic pressure on North Korea: This proposal entailed a total embargo on
trade by the United States and its allies, particularly a cessation of Japanese im-
ports from North Korea and elimination of wheat exports to it. (Japan was the
largest free-world importer of goods from North Korea, and wheat accounted
for half of the free world’s exports to that nation.) The Korea Working Group
saw little prospect for success: communist shipping lines and overland routes
would compensate for the loss of free-world vessels, and in any case key U.S. al-
lies trading with Pyongyang were unlikely to cooperate.
On 29 January, a senior advisory group including Rusk and several
high-ranking State Department officials, Helms, Rostow, and General Maxwell
Taylor (then acting as a special military consultant to the president) met to re-
view the operational alternatives offered by the Korea Working Group. The
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advisory group rapidly and “universally” agreed that the United States should
make no further military or diplomatic moves until it could ascertain whether
U.S.–North Korean contacts at Panmunjom might be fruitful. The panel quickly
eliminated several possible courses of action: in its view, selective air strikes were
solely retaliatory and would diminish prospects for early release of Pueblo;
blockade was inconclusive and potentially escalatory; and mining risked air
combat and escalation. The panel
further ruled out putting Banner
on station, at least in the manner
proposed, and concluded that re-
covery of the Pueblo’s crypto-
graphic material was “almost an
impossible task”—the attempt could lead to “unsought sustained hostilities.”
The meeting found free-world economic pressure unattractive, because of its
limited impact and the difficulties of implementing it, especially since opposi-
tion from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany was likely.46
The other options were received more favorably. In particular, if the crew and
the ship—or even just the ship—were not returned, seizure of a North Korean
vessel seemed to be a “punishment that fitted the crime.” The panel recom-
mended further staff work to locate North Korean vessels that might be suscep-
tible to seizure in international waters.
The senior advisory group, however, recommended suspension of reconnais-
sance for several days. If these flights were to be resumed, the panel recom-
mended they be BLACK SHIELD missions. The group also recommended that the
United States consider bombing exercises in South Korea, for their demonstra-
tion value.47
After its deliberations, the panel met with President Lyndon Johnson. It ad-
vised him that “[we] should keep our eyes on the major objectives in this crisis:
get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship returned; keep the confidence
of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment
of force in South Vietnam; and avoid a second front in Asia.”48 Meeting privately
with Democratic congressional leaders the following week, President Johnson
echoed the theme: “We are trying to keep them [the North Koreans] talking. The
Joint Chiefs have shown me twenty military plans, but none of them would get
our men back alive.”49
Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
made the same observation, but with a weather eye out for the possibility of
things going amiss. In a “personal for” message to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, he summarized the planning:
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Our chances to get the crew back seem greatest if we do not make a show of force off
Wonsan. . . . I have told CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF [Commanders in Chief,
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air Forces] to caution their people that we want no belliger-
ent statements from anyone at this juncture and that they should caution their peo-
ple to remain quiet. . . . I don’t believe there is any military move that we can make
that will assist us in getting the Pueblo crew returned. . . . If diplomatic efforts for re-
turn of the Pueblo crew are not successful then we should consider moving Banner
and escorts off Wonsan in accordance with the plan I have submitted. We could eas-
ily stir up a hornet’s nest with this move and we must be prepared to take such steps
as necessary to come out on top. The conventional weapons strike plan we have sub-
mitted gives various options for this contingency. We must also be prepared for re-
taliatory strikes against South Korea. Mining of Wonsan and/or Hungnam and the
harbor on the west coast [Nampo?] can be accomplished without great difficulty. It
should have a salutary effect on North Korea if a move of this severity is required. We
also will be ready with various nuclear options. . . . I am not sure any of these military
moves will assist in getting the Pueblo crew back but they would teach North Korea a
lesson.50
The national command authorities thus at least temporarily ruled out most
forcible options, although they had already taken steps to prepare for a wide
range of military contingencies. Some measures were visible immediately. On 25
January, some reserve units had been called up, terms of military service had
been extended, and 361 aircraft had been ordered into the western Pacific. The
White House had approved moving additional carriers into the Sea of Japan, sta-
tioning more aircraft in South Korea, and alerting thirty-six B-52s for move-
ment to Okinawa and Guam. The Joint Staff had also taken unpublicized steps
to enhance readiness for war on the Korean Peninsula.51
PREPARING FOR MANY CONTINGENCIES
On 25 January, upon Washington’s commitment to augment the U.S. presence
in the Sea of Japan, the Seventh Fleet implemented operation FORMATION STAR.
The operation order directed the Enterprise task group to prepare for a number
of operations: assuming custody of and towing Pueblo; receiving returned U.S.
personnel; conducting photo reconnaissance of Wonsan; and executing retalia-
tory air strikes or “other offensive actions as directed.” The task group was to
remain, and conduct flight operations, south of the thirty-eighth parallel; how-
ever, immediate (“hot”) pursuit was authorized north of that line, and ships and
aircraft could operate north of it to protect friendly forces. U.S. units were not
authorized to penetrate the territorial sea/air space of the People’s Democratic
Republic.52 Shows of force were prohibited; if attacked, however, the task group
was to take “immediate and aggressive protective measures.” In addition to the
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Seventh Fleet measures, the South Korean navy had placed nineteen ships and
two fast patrol boats in sixteen patrol sectors around the Republic of Korea.53
By 1 February, the task groups of the carriers Enterprise, USS Ranger (CV 61),
and USS Yorktown (CVS 10) had arrived in the Sea of Japan and formed a task
force.54 The Joint Chiefs had also directed the Pacific Command to deploy up to
nine diesel and nuclear attack submarines to Korea “as soon as practicable.”55
The Banner was to augment the force; Pacific Command directed the Seventh
Fleet to get the intelligence collector under way to join the task force as soon as
feasible. The move was symbolic: “Technical collection capability is secondary
to this mission and should not repeat not delay sailing.”56 Banner rendezvoused
with the force on 31 January but remained clear of North Korea’s claimed terri-
torial waters.57
During the first two weeks of the crisis, the Air Force had deployed aircraft
from the United States into the region, and from within the western Pacific to Korea
itself. Relatively few had been available in Korea at the outset; on 26 January,
there were 214 U.S. and South Korean aircraft in Korea, of which 187 were on alert.58
But on the 27th, the chief of staff of the Air Force released a flash-precedence op-
eration order for the rapid deployment of elements of nine fighter and intercep-
tor squadrons, along with B-52s and support aircraft (see the table). Supported
by sixty-six KC-135 tankers, the tactical units were to arrive in Korea within five
days of receiving orders to move to one of
five bases: Kimpo (just northwest of Seoul),
Osan, Kunsan, Suwon (south of Seoul), or
Kwangju. Twenty-six B-52Ds would then de-
ploy to Guam.59 By 7 February, 395 Ameri-
can and South Korean aircraft were in Korea,
and 308 of these were combat ready.60
As for U.S. ground forces in Korea, plan-
ners were immediately concerned about
personnel and logistical shortfalls. Because
of the demands of the Vietnam War, the two
U.S. divisions were at approximately 70
percent of authorized strength.61 They were
now to be reinforced by 8,500 troops.62 Even by late February, however, ammu-
nition was available for only forty-five combat days for these two divisions, and
eighteen combat days for the South Korean units.63 Eighth Army had on hand
23,300 tons of its war-reserve requirement of 39,400 tons.64 A sharp increase in
air munitions was also needed. The Joint Staff assessed that Pacific Command’s
Air Force component (which had only four thousand tons in Korea) would im-
mediately require 12,700 tons of munitions, and Pacific Fleet naval aviation









U.S. AIR FORCE DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT
15
Mobley: Pueblo—A Retrospective
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
(which had 2,800 tons of munitions in Sasebo) needed 11,400 tons. However,
over twelve thousand tons of ammunition were en route and would be available
to both by 10 February.65
As General Bonesteel had foreseen, the vulnerability of sensitive installations
proved worrisome both immediately and in the long term. U.S. planners were
particularly concerned about the security of the unhardened South Korean air-
fields, Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile sites, and nuclear weapons facilities.
Several steps were taken to augment the protection of all these sites. By 30 Janu-
ary, the ROK First Army had been directed to provide two infantry battalions
for airfield protection, one for Osan and the other for Kunsan.66 By 7 February,
construction of semipermanent shelters and other forms of physical protection
for the Nike-Hercules sites and their missiles was under way.67 The Joint Staff
recommended that the Defense Department assign additional personnel to pro-
vide more security for nuclear weapons sites, and it initiated a longer-term study
on physical security improvements to these facilities.68
Thus the United States girded for war while seeking to avoid it. The Pueblo
buildup was costly, particularly because it diverted assets needed in Vietnam.
Faced with a hostage situation on a large scale in 1968, decision makers in Wash-
ington were generally inclined to diplomacy from the first day of the crisis. So-
viet pressure was also a factor; in response to U.S. requests for its “good offices,”
Moscow had argued repeatedly that the naval and air buildup was counter-
productive. Premier Alexei Kosygin warned President Johnson on 3 February
that the buildup only raised tensions and had no chance of resolving the crisis.
Johnson responded on 5 February that “on the assumption that . . . we [Wash-
ington and Moscow] want peace in that area and that we will both work to that
end,” there would be no further air and naval buildup; further, he would order
one carrier task group to move “somewhat southward.” Accordingly, the Enter-
prise group sailed through the Tsushima Strait to a point approximately twelve
hours’ steaming time from its original position in the Sea of Japan. The national
command authorities, however, would not release all naval assets committed to
the contingency for several more weeks.69
The United States, then, never abandoned the option of force, but the most
visible and frenetic military efforts were over. In more ways than were then pub-
licly apparent, the U.S. military had handled a daunting array of planning, de-
ployment, and logistical tasks smoothly and in a remarkably short period. The
incident remains painful to recall, even so long after the fact. The material now
available, however, makes much clearer how military commanders and national
decision makers responded to an unprecedented and challenging situation.
Analogous problems would later arise in Tehran and Lebanon, when concern for
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American lives and the limitations of military force would compel U.S. leaders
to use diplomatic means to free Americans held hostage.
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